




## ***ASCAP BRIEFING***

***22 OCTOBER 2002***

***Professor Ted C. Giras***



## ***ASCAP BRIEFING TOPICS***

### ● **CSX CBTM STATUS**

- DTC: TRAFFIC EXPOSURE ALGORITHM (TEA)
- TRAIN DYNAMIC MOVEMENT
- SEVERITY – MISHAP CLASSIFICATION
- RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR
- HUMAN-FACTORS

### ● **ASCAP++ LESSONS LEARNED EXTENSIONS**

- CTC: TRAFFIC EXPOSURE ALGORITHM (TEA)
- CTC WAYSIDE INTERLOCKING
- CAB SIGNALING
- BLACKBOARDS
- MAINTENANCE-OF-WAY (MOW)
- MULTI-STATE DEVICE PROBABILISTIC BEHAVIOR
- EVENTS PASSED AT DANGER (EPADS) – FAULT TREES
- EPAD LOGS
- SEVERITY & MISHAPS

## ***CSX DTC-CBTM STATUS***

### ● ***OVERVIEW***

- GENETIC ALGORITHM USED TO IDENTIFY TMA HIDDEN PARAMETERS
- HYBRID TRAIN DYNAMIC MOVEMENT MODEL INSTALLED
- FRA/CSX DEVELOPING TMA STRING CHARTS TO VERIFY ASCAP TMA
- EVENT PASSED AT DANGER LOGS COMPLETED
- RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR PERFORMANCE VERIFIED
- HUMAN-FACTORS CALIBRATION COMPLETE
- SEVERITY – MISHAP MODEL COMPLETED

### ● ***FINAL PRESENTATION TO “PEER REVIEW” GROUP REQUIRED***

## ***WHAT ARE THE ASCAP++ LESSONS LEARNED ?***

### ● OVERVIEW

- CTC TRAFFIC EXPOSURE ALGORITHM (TEA)
- TRAIN DYNAMIC MOVEMENT MODEL
- CTC WAYSIDE INTERLOCKING
- CAB SIGNALING
- BLACKBOARDS
- MAINTENANCE-OF-WAY WORKERS (MOW)
- MULTI-STATE DEVICE PROBABILISTIC BEHAVIOR
- EVENTS PASSED AT DANGER (EPADS) – FAULT TREES
- SEVERITY & MISHAPS

## ***CTC: TRAFFIC EXPOSURE ALGORITHM (TEA)***

- DEFINES THE COMPUTER AIDED DISPATCH TRAIN MOVEMENT CAPABILITIES
- TEA IS PARTITIONED AS FOUR(4) SEGMENTS:
  - COMPUTER AIDED DISPATCH (CAD) SCHEDULING
  - MEET/PASS CONFLICT RESOLUTION
  - IMPLEMENTS TRAIN CONSIST PRIORITIES
  - TRAIN DYNAMIC MOVEMENT MODEL
  - TRAIN CONSIST AND MOW EQUIPMENT MOVEMENT

## ***TRAIN DYNAMIC MOVEMENT MODEL***

- HYBRID TRAIN DYNAMIC MODEL INSTALLED WITH THE FOLLOWING FEATURES:
  - DAVIS EQUATION, GRAVITY, LENGTH, TRACTION EFFORT
  - FOR DISCRETE EVENT SIMULATION POLYNOMIALS PROVIDE FOR EACH SPEED ZONE THE FOLLOWING:
    - ◆ AVERAGE SPEED VERSUS WEIGHT/POWER RATIO (LENGTH)
- MISHAP POTENTIAL DETECTION USES CONTINUOUS SIMULATION:
  - ACTIVATED WITH AN EVENT PASSED AT DANGER
  - INTEGRATED WITH HUMAN-FACTORS
  - PROVIDES TRAIN MOVEMENT DYNAMIC VECTOR

## ***CTC WAYSIDE INTERLOCKING***

- WAYSIDE SIGNAL CONTROLS DEFINED BY BOOLEAN EQUATIONS TO PERFORM THE FOLLOWING TYPICAL FUNCTIONS:
  - FUNCTION OF TRACK OCCUPANCY
  - FUNCTION OF CAD TRAIN ROUTE LOCKING
  - PREVENTS DISPATCHER FROM ASSIGNING CONFLICTING ROUTES
  - BOOLEAN EQUATIONS USED TO SIMULATE SIGNALING LOGIC

## ***CAB SIGNALING***

- CAB SIGNING MODEL HAS BEEN DEVELOPED WITH THE AID OF US&S AND UP:
- THE FOLLOWING MAJOR ELEMENTS ARE CONSIDERED:
  - ON-BOARD AUTOMATIC TRAIN PROTECTION (ATP)
  - FOUR(4) ASPECT ON-BOARD DISPLAY
  - LOCOMOTIVE TRACK CIRCUIT READER
  - TRACK CIRCUIT INTEGRATION
  - WAYSIDE SIGNAL INTEGRATION




## *Human Factors Model*

- Supports train crew, dispatcher and mow
  - Voice control
  - Train handling
- Model Parameters
  - Probability of recognition
  - Probability of interpretation
  - Probability of coverage
  - Probability of compliance
- Integrated with the Dynamic Train Model
- Integrated with CTC Signaling Blackboards

## ***MOW Model***

- Supports predefined or dispatcher generated work zones:
  - Dispatchers can spawn work zones due to train crews reporting equipment failures encountered while in route
  - Dispatchers can set up overlapping work zones
  - Dispatcher can can improperly revoke work zone limits (give a clear to a train crew while MOW still working)
  - Dispatchers can improperly set speed too high in work zones.
- Voice control provided by EIC
- Work zones marked by flags
  - Flags may be missing or inappropriately displayed.
- MOW workers may work outside assigned work zone

## Multi-State Model



- Captures appliance behavior
  - Incorporates transient behaviors
  - Incorporates improper repair effects
- Model Parameters
  - Failure rate (includes effects of transient & permanent)
  - Hardware/software Coverage
  - Repair
  - Human repair coverage

## ***Events Passed At Danger (EPAD)***

- Identify train exposure to either an agent violation or an object hazard
- Triggers the potential for a mishap pair condition
  - Simulation trigger to check mishap conditions
  - Either precede or are coincident with a mishap
- ASCAP calculated the last past six Events Passed at Danger(EPADS)
- EPADS equivalent to PHA Fault Tree construction

## ***SEVERITY & MISHAPS***

- Severity calculated based on both Historical and Expert Opinion:
  - Societal cost for each Mishap estimated based on historical data comparison with ASCAP variables obtained from the Train Consist Dynamic Behavior
  - Historical data is not sufficient and must be supplemented with Expert Opinion
  - Mean and Variance calculated for each Mishap to determine Non-Accident versus Accident
  - Accident history documented as an FRA Accident Report

## *EPAD Logs*

- CONTENT DERIVED TO SUPPORT:
  - ASCAP HISTORICAL DATA MINING
  - CONSTRUCTION OF EPAD INFORMATION
    - ◆ PROBABILISTIC BEHAVIOR
    - ◆ OPERATIONAL RULE BOOK COMPLIANCE –NON COMPLIANCE
  - SUPPORT SEVERITY- MISHAP MODEL
    - ◆ PROVIDE DATA TO DETERMINE NON ACCIDENT - ACCIDENT

## **CONCLUSION(S)**

- PROPOSE AN ASCAP WORKSHOP FOR NEXT RSAC SESSION:
  - ONE DAY SESSION
  - WEB-BASED DEMONSTRATION
- OTHER INFORMATION:
  - COLLABORATION WITH CHINA BEING ESTABLISHED
  - UVA CENTER TO BE DULPLICATED AT SHANGHI UNIVERSITY
  - CHINA FALCULTY TO BE IN RESIDENCE AT UVA BY DECEMBER